ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission in multigroup multicasting cell-free massive MIMO system in the presence of pilot spoofing attack. With the imperfect uplink and downlink channel estimation, a distributed conjugate beamforming processing with normalized power constraint policy is exploited at access points (APs) for downlink multicasting data transmission. Closed-form expressions for the per-user achievable rate are derived with and without downlink training, respectively. Also, the analytical results of the upper bound on the information leakage to eavesdropper are carried out. Moreover, a mechanism based on the minimum description length (MDL) is presented to detect pilot spoofing attack. Consequently, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate is obtained to evaluate the system's secrecy performance. The numerical results are presented to quantitatively analyze the impacts of eavesdropper's spoofing pilot power and the number of groups on the secrecy performance of the considered systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cell-Free massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is a promising network architecture where many geographically distributed access points (APs) jointly serve some users in the same frequency-time resource [1] . Compared to both small cell and co-located massive MIMO, Cell-Free massive MIMO can offer very high coverage, spectral and energy efficiency by exploiting the advantages of both network MIMO and colocated massive MIMO systems [2] , [3] . Moreover, multigroup multicasting is an appealing scenario for massive MIMO due to the increasing demand for the multicasting applications [4] , such as group communications, software updates, news headlines and mobile TV. In general, multicasting involves multiple groups where the users in each group are interested in different multicasting data streams, which has been incorporated in 3GPP Rel-9 known as evolved multimedia broadcast/multicasting service (eMBMS) [5] .
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In recent years, many aspects including of performance analysis, power control and beamforming in Cell-Free massive MIMO networks have been further studied [1] , [2] , 5, 6 . Additionally, as a supplement, a user-centric (UC) virtual-cell massive MIMO approach has been proposed to improve the system performance [6] . Via time-division duplex (TDD) operation, channel state information (CSI) can be acquired by uplink training exploiting the channel reciprocity property in Cell-Free massive MIMO systems. Due to the channel hardening, downlink data can be reliably decoded using only statistical CSI [1] , [2] . However, the channel hardening is less pronounced in Cell-Free massive MIMO owing to the wide geographic distribution. In this case, downlink pilots have the potential to improve the achievable information rate [8] . In addition, some researchers recently have investigated the performance of the multigroup multicasting massive MIMO systems. Authors in [4] investigated the optimal multicasting beamformer design and analyzed the asymptotic performance of the proposed scheme. Authors in [9] presented the asymptotic performance of multi-cell multi-group massive multicasting MIMO systems under pilot contamination. Different from [4] and [9] , the closedform net throughput of the multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO system has been presented in [10] which has taken into account the imperfect estimated channel state information (CSI).
Different from the traditional higher-layer cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has been proposed based on the principles of information theoretic security which exploits the inherent randomness of the wireless medium to achieve perfect secrecy with remarkably low computational complexity [11] . In MIMO scenario, confidential messages can be spatially multiplexed onto multiple independent subchannels which may change drastically over frequency, time and space [12] . Therefore, signal processing techniques in the physical layer (e.g., secrecy beamforming and precoding, artificial noise etc.) can be exploited to enhance secrecy by enlarging substantial signal quality differences at the destination and the eavesdropper [13] . As one of the emerging and most promising techniques, large-scale antenna systems (massive MIMO) can provide extremely high spectral efficiency which can help to meet the anticipated demands in the fifth generation (5G) era [14] . The integration of physical layer security in massive MIMO communication systems is a very promising domain. The passive eavesdropping and active attacks have been well considered in [15] , [16] and [17] , which verifies that massive MIMO is robust against passive attacks while it is seriously threatened by active attacks. Due to the serious damages, active eavesdropping has attracted much attention. An active eavesdropper can attack the channel training phase by transmitting the same pilot sequence, which is the so-called pilot spoofing attacks [18] . In particular, Wu et al. studied the secure transmission schemes in multi-user multi-cell massive MIMO systems with a multi-antenna active eavesdropper by exploiting matched filter precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation [19] . However, they only focused on co-located massive MIMO network. The authors in [20] investigated the secure transmission of the Cell-Free massive MIMO system under a pilot spoofing attack, which also provided optimal power allocation schemes to maximize the achievable data rate or achievable secrecy rate. Moreover, authors in [21] firstly studied the security aspect of multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO systems and provided the closed-form expressions for the achievable secrecy rate. However, only uplink training was considered in this paper. To mitigate the significant information leakage, it is of crucial importance to be aware of the pilot contamination attack. Authors in [22] presented three different schemes (at base station, intended user, or jointly) for detecting active eavesdropping. In addition, some slowly changing parameters including signal power, large-scale fading, or certain statistics can be exploited in detection schemes [18] , [23] . Specially, Minimum description length (MDL) is one simple but favorable information theoretic criteria for determining the number of present signals which has been successfully utilized for active attack detection in multi-antenna systems [24] , [25] .
Inspired by these works, this paper studies the secure communication and active attack detection of multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO network with both uplink and downlink training. And the closed-form secrecy rate expression is provided. Most importantly, this is the first work on the integration of security with the multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO network with both uplink and downlink training in the presence of active spoofing attack. Main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• For the classical multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO network, the secure transmission under active spoofing attack has been considered. We consider a new scheme with both uplink and downlink training. Besides, the conjugate beamforming is used for downlink data transmission and downlink training, which takes imperfect channel estimation into account.
• We consider two different schemes, namely, one only with the conventional uplink training and the other with both uplink and downlink training. Under the assumption that the eavesdropper can acquire perfect CSI, we derive the closed-form expressions of the achievable information rate of legitimate user and information leakage to the eavesdropper, which show that the active spoofing attack is dangerous for secure communication of the considered systems.
• Motivated by minimizing the damages caused by the pilot spoofing attack, we propose a novel effective approach based on MDL criterion to detect the active attackers. In this scheme, new pilot signals are designed for active attack detection. Then, the detection is operated by computing the subspace dimension of the received signal correlation matrix. The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model, also introduce the uplink training, downlink multicasting data transmission and downlink training. Section III derives the secrecy performance analysis on the considered system. Section IV presents an active spoofing attack detection algorithm. Simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: Boldface letters represent the vector, e.g. h.
(·)
T , (·) * and (·) H stand for transpose, conjugate and conjugate-transpose. E {·} and Var {·} denote operations of expectation and variance, respectively. A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector x with mean m and covariance matrix A can be denoted by x ∼ CN (m, A). C M ×N stands for M ×N dimensional complex space. In addition, i.i.d indicates the abbreviation of independent and identically distributed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO system with M single-antenna APs in the presence of an active eavesdropper (Eve) as shown in Fig. 1 . It is assumed that the cell has N groups where each group has K VOLUME 7, 2019 single-antenna users. All users in the same group request the same message. Moreover, all APs are connected to a central processing unit (CPU) via perfect backhaul links to share and exchange information. Let
1 / 2 mE h mE ) be the channel coefficient between the kth user in the nth group (Eve) and the mth AP, where β mn k (β mE ) denotes the large scale fading known in advance and h mn k (h mE ) ∼ CN (0, 1) implies the small scale fading. To utilize the channel reciprocity property, TDD protocol is considered in this letter. This transmission protocol allows utilizing uplink training to obtain the CSI. An intelligent active Eve can pretend to be one legitimate user node in the target group and sends the same pilot sequence as legitimate users to attack the uplink training. In most previous studies, users always decode the downlink data using only statistical CSI without downlink training. To obtain performance improvements in Cell-Free massive MIMO systems, users can exploit the instantaneous CSI by downlink training to operate signal detection. In this paper, we consider both uplink and downlink training.
A. UPLINK TRAINING
It is important to obtain the CSI to perform the precoding at APs and data detection at user terminals. All APs can obtain the CSI by uplink training. As the same scheme in [8] , [10] , different groups are allocated different pair wisely orthogonal pilot sequences of length τ p (all users in the same group use the same pilot sequence). Let √ τ p ϕ n ∈ C τ p ×1 , where
, be the pilot sequence sent by the users in nth group. In general, as the pilot sequences are public and standardized, Eve can easily spoof to send the same pilot as legitimate users to change the beam direction. Without loss of generality, we assume that Eve aims to intercept the confidential messages intended for the nth group, that is,
denotes the pilot sequence of Eve. Hence, the received pilot vector at the mth AP is given by
where ρ u (ρ E ) represents the normalized average signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) of user (Eve) uplink pilot symbol, and ω m is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector with ω m ∼ CN (0, I). By projecting y
m onto ϕ n , we can rewrite the processed signal as
where δ (0) = 1 and δ (n) = 0, n = 0. Then minimum mean squared error (MMSE) approach is adopted to estimate the channels aŝ
Sinceỹ
mn follows Gaussian distribution, we can denote that g mn k = γ mn k z mn , where z mn ∼ CN (0, 1) and
Similarly, the estimate of Eve's channel can be given bŷ
B. DOWNLINK MULTICASTING TRANSMISSION
In order to avoid sharing of CSI and exchanging data among the APs or the CPU, the conjugate beamforming is exploited to precode the messages to all groups [4] , [8] , [10] . The set of messages to all multicasting groups is represented by
Then, with the acquired CSI from the uplink training, the transmit multicasting signal at the mth AP is given by
where ρ d is the normalized SNR at downlink transmission. Note that, all APs simultaneously transmit signals to all users. We denote the received signal at the kth user in the nth group and Eve as
where
and ω E ∼ CN (0, 1) are additive noise components.
C. DOWNLINK TRAINING
Thanks to channel hardening in massive MIMO, the users can use only the channel statistics, i.e., E a n k , to decode the downlink data. Hence, most existing works assume there is no downlink training. However, in a Cell-Free system, due to the large distribution area of the APs, each user is effectively served by finite APs [8] . Especially for a moderately large M , channel hardening does not hold, and hence, downlink training can be operated to achieve more accurate CSI.
To avoid information exchange among the APs, the Beamforming Training scheme is adopted for downlink training. In this letter, the downlink pilots are beamformed to the groups. The overhead of this pilot scheme is independent of M which depends on the number of the groups as well as uplink training.
Let
×1 be the downlink pilot sequence for nth group, where ψ n
Moreover, the APs exploit the same beamforming scheme as multicasting data transmission to precode the downlink pilot sequences. The precoded pilot sequence at mth AP can be denoted by
where ρ d,p is the total normalized average SNR of downlink pilot sequence at mth AP, and ψ n (n = 1, 2, · · · , N ) are assumed pairwise orthogonal, i.e. ψ H n ψ n = 0, n = n. Then the received signal at the kth user in the nth group can be denoted by y dp,
a n k ψ n + w dp,n k ,
where w dp,n k represents the additive noise vector at the kth user in the nth group with i.i.d CN (0, 1) random variable elements. In order to estimate the effective channel gain a n k , the received downlink pilot signal y dp,n k can be firstly projected onto ψ n as y dp,n k = ψ H n y dp,
where w dp,n k = ψ H n w dp,n k ∼ CN (0, 1). Then the linear MMSE estimation is performed to estimate a n k aŝ
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To obtain the achievable secrecy rate, the achievable information rates of legitimate users and Eve should be investigated respectively. Firstly, we consider the scheme only with uplink training. Due to the property of channel hardening, legitimate users can utilize the statistics, i.e. E a n k , as the real a n k to detect s n . And the other terms can be treated as effective noise. Provided that the worst-case Gaussian noise argument, we obtain a lower bound for the achievable rate * given in (10) , as shown at the top of the next page. Note that downlink training has not been used in the above scheme. Then, we focus on the situation with both uplink and downlink training. As a n k is the sum of many terms, it is asymptotically Gaussian distributed. With MMSE estimate scheme, the effective channel gain can be denoted by a n k =â n k +ã n k , where estimation errorã n k is independent withâ n k . Hence, the achievable downlink rate of the aim user can be written as (11) , as shown at the top of the next page.
On the other hand, to consider the worst case in terms of security, we assume that Eve perfectly knows channel gains. Hence, Eve can get the upper bound on the eavesdropping information rate, which can be represented as
Besides, this paper only considers one eavesdropper equipped with only a single antenna. If there are multiple eavesdroppers or eavesdropper equipped with multiple antennas existing in the networks which can be called as the multiple-input, multiple-output, multiantenna eavesdropper (MIMOME). According to some existing literatures [12] , [26] , the model in this paper can be extended to MIMOME scenario by utilizing secrecy precoding (or beamforming) and random matrix theory. As this issue is outside the scope of this paper, it can be left for future works.
Based on (10), (11) and (12), we can obtain the lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate as follows:
where [x] + = max {0, x}. Theorem 1: With the active pilot spoofing attack, imperfect channel estimation and conjugate beamforming, the closedform expression of the achievable rate of kth user in nth group is given by (14) , as shown at the top of the next page, where
And the information intended to nth group leaked to Eve can be given by (15) , as shown at the top of the next page.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
IV. ACTIVE ATTACK DETECTION
According to the above analysis, pilot spoofing attack injures channel estimation to achieve a significant information leakage to Eve. To migrate this effect, we can operate pilot * Strictly speaking, the derived results are spectral efficiency (bits/s/Hz) as bandwidth hasn't been considered at the expressions of R n k and R nE . VOLUME 7, 2019
Only with uplink training,
, With both uplink and downlink training.
spoofing attack detection at APs, which can be considered as a hypothesis testing problem. Note that the dimension of signal subspace at APs is two while it is one with spoofing attack absent. Thus, the minimum description length (MDL) criterion can be used to operate the detection. Assuming broadcast content to nth group is the confidential information, only TUs in nth group transmit pilot sequence in the detection phase. In addition, a fraction φ of the pilot power ρ u has been allocated to add another random detection pilot sequence ϕ r (zero-mean, i.i.d., normalized norm, ϕ r
Other groups keep silent in this phase. Hence, the received signal at mth AP can be given by (16) , as shown at the top of this page. In addition, the pilot spoofing power is zero with a passive Eve, i.e. ρ E = 0.
Firstly, we present two hypotheses with H 0 denoting no active attack and H 1 representing presence of active attack [27] . For easy description, we define a receiving signal matrix at APs as
Then the correlation matrix of the received pilot signals can be obtained by
Then we can further obtain that
∈ C 2×τ p . Evidently, we note that rank R S,0 = 1. Since UTs and Eve always have different fading channels, i.e. g n = g E , we can always obtain that rank R S,1 = 2 if φ > 0. Thus, the binary hypothesis testing is essentially equivalent to estimate the signal correlation matrix rank d (signal subspace dimension d = rank R S,i ). Then we discuss the typical MDL estimation algorithm.
In the first place, we need the eigenvalue decomposition of matrix R Y ,i and order the eigenvalues by
Then, the MDL estimator of d is presented as [27] , [28] 
where the object function is given by
Now the hypotheses can be formulated as
Note that the MDL estimation method needs no threshold calculation. In addition, we acknowledge that the detection probability P d can be represented as
while, the miss probability is given by P d = 1 d = 2 which has been precisely calculated with the parameters N d , ρ and β [24] , [29] . Due to the space restrictions, we neglect the details in this paper.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulations are provided to evaluate the secrecy performance of our considered system. 10 5 independent Monte-Carlo experiments are operated for this following scenario: all APs and served users are randomly located within a circle cell of 600m. The active eavesdropper also locates randomly in this region. The large-scale path-loss is modeled as
where d, d r = 50m and v = 3 respectively represent geographical distance, reference distance and path-loss exponent [30] . Moreover, we choose that M = 100, K = 5,
The simulation area is wrapped around to avoid the cell-edge effects. First, we focus on the performance gain, where two scenarios (with downlink training (DT) and without DT) have been considered. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 illustrate the cumulative distributions of the achievable rates by users and Eve, which show that the achievable information rates of the legitimate users with DT is significantly higher than the case without DT. Moreover, both information rates are monotonically decreasing in group number. It can be explained by the fact that the inter-group interference increases with increasing N , then the rates decrease. Also, Fig. 2 shows that the performance gap decreases with group number N . It is because of the fact that channel hardening is more pronounced in a higher network density scenario and the downlink beamforming training scheme yields a lower performance gain. Moreover, it can be observed that R nE is impaired with increasing N and is improved with increasing ρ E . Fig. 3 indicates that Eve's rates strongly depend on ρ E . Obviously, Eve is able VOLUME 7, 2019 to improve its eavesdropping ability by increasing spoofing signals power.
Next, Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distributions of the secrecy rates under different schemes with and without downlink training, respectively. As we can see, downlink training scheme outperforms the statistical CSI case with any N or ρ E . Moreover, it is observed that the secrecy performance degrades with increasing ρ E . Obviously, increasing ρ E enlarges the information leakage and decreases the secrecy rate. Hence, the secrecy rate decreases. Besides, we can observe that the curves has crossed with each other when system utilizes the same training scheme with the same Eve's spoofing pilot power ρ E . It's easy to explain that both R n k and R nE monotonically decrease with increasing N . While the decrease speeds of the two achievable information rates may be different which depend on the layout locations of legitimate users and Eve. Hence, the impacts of N on the secrecy performance should be investigated in fixed network layout. Moreover, since the coherence interval generally is sufficiently-large [20] , we ignore the training overhead in the simulations.
Here, we further investigate the active attack detection algorithm presented in Fig. 5 , where the probability values were averaged over 5000 runs. Some simulation parameters are chosen as ρ p = 10dB, φ= 0. 5, τ p = 5, 10 and M = 30, 50, 100. It is evident that the detection performance improves with increasing the number of APs and pilot sequence length. Besides, the probabilities are all over 0. 96 at ρ E = 7dB. Thus, the presented detection method is able to detect active attacks at low power levels. Note that we have only investigated the impact on detection performance over few parameters (ρ E , M and τ p ). Actually, we can make an extension that all users have the autonomy to adjust their own transmit power and pilot sequence design. These issues can be left for future works.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the secure transmission in a multigroup multicasting Cell-Free massive MIMO network in the presence of active spoofing attack. Based on the imperfect CSI obtained by uplink and downlink channel estimation, distributed conjugate beamforming with normalized power constraint is utilized for downlink multicasting data transmission. We derive a closed-form lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate which is adopted to evaluate the security performance. In addition, we presented a novel mechanism using the MDL algorithm to detect spoofing relay attack. Simulation results confirm that higher Eve's spoofing pilot power or larger group number cause a significant secrecy performance degradation. In addition, non-orthogonal pilots scheme and active eavesdropping attack detection may be included in future work. In addition, the AN scheme is an effective enabling technology for secure transmission over MIMO systems. To avoid cooperation and data interchanging among the APs, AN has not been considered in this paper. To further improve systems' secrecy performance, physical layer jamming techniques, including secrecy beamforming and AN aiding, should also been considered in future works.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on the deduction of Theorem 1 in [10] , we have that
β mn k . By using the similar derivation in [10] , we can easily derive the expression of R n k as (14) in the case of no downlink training. Now let us focus on the case with both uplink and downlink training.
Specifically, we consider the term E ã n k 2 as
Var a n k ȳ dp,n k − E a n k
Var a n k w dp,n k
By substituting the expressions of the terms into (11), we can obtain the closed form expression of R n k with both uplink and downlink training in (14) .
Then, we compute the component E |a nE | 2 in (12) . Due to the fact that z mn ∼ CN (0, 1), we can get the result that E {|z mn |} = +∞ 0
Hence, the term can be rewritten as
Utilizing the similar analytic procedures, we can easily derive the other terms expressions in Theorem 1. Due to the space limit, we don't state the deduction process in details here. This concludes the proof. 
